...and that local air superiority was to be desired. It thoroughly offset those concessions by stating that "the most important target at a particular time...target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force" and by giving to the commander of the supported unit...

...to the air support command."" Yet "the most important target at a particular time," FM 31-35 added, "will usually be that target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force. The final decision as to priority of targets rests with...

...were inadequate or unavailable) and that local air superiority was to be desired, the manual recited that "the most important target at a particular time...target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force. The final decision as to priority of targets rests with...

...supremacy in the battle area might be necessary but, according to Field Manual 31-35 of 9 April 1942, "the most important target at a particular time will...target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force." And in any case, the "final decision as to priority...

...decision as to target priorities: "the most important target at a particular time," the manual stated, "will usually be that target which constitutes the most serious threat to the operations of the supported ground force." At best the air support command would provide a centralized...