Rationality and the Reflective MindIn Rationality and the Reflective Mind, Keith Stanovich attempts to resolve the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science--the debate about how much irrationality to ascribe to human cognition. He shows how the insights of dual-process theory and evolutionary psychology can be combined to explain why humans are sometimes irrational even though they possess remarkably adaptive cognitive machinery. Stanovich argues that to fully characterize differences in rational thinking, we need to replace dual-process theories with tripartite models of cognition. Using a unique individual differences approach, he shows that the traditional second system (System 2) of dual-process theory must be further divided into the reflective mind and the algorithmic mind. Distinguishing them will allow us to better appreciate the significant differences in their key functions: The key function of the reflective mind is to detect the need to interrupt autonomous processing and to begin simulation activities, whereas that of the algorithmic mind is to sustain the processing of decoupled secondary representations in cognitive simulation. Stanovich then uses this algorithmic/reflective distinction to develop a taxonomy of cognitive errors made on tasks in the heuristics and biases literature. He presents the empirical data to show that the tendency to make these thinking errors is not highly related to intelligence. Using his tripartite model of cognition, Stanovich shows how, when both are properly defined, rationality is a more encompassing construct than intelligence, and that IQ tests fail to assess individual differences in rational thought. He then goes on to discuss the types of thinking processes that would be measured if rational thinking were to be assessed as IQ has been. |
Contents
1 DualProcess Theory and the Great Rationality Debate | 3 |
2 Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind and the Reflective Mind | 29 |
3 The Key Functions of the Reflective Mind and the Algorithmic Mind that Support Human Rationality | 47 |
4 The TriProcess Model and Serial Associative Cognition | 61 |
5 The Master Rationality Motive and the Origins of the Nonautonomous Mind | 81 |
6 A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems | 95 |
7 Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks | 121 |
Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate | 155 |
9 The Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality | 175 |
10 The Assessment of Rational Thought | 191 |
References | 247 |
| 303 | |
| 319 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
activity algorithmic alternative argued argument assessment associative autonomous behavior belief better bias biases brain Cambridge capacity Chapter cognitive ability components concept construct correlations critical Crystallized decision decoupling discussed displayed domain effects errors et al evaluation Evans evidence example experiment Experimental fact Figure fluid Form framing functioning goal heuristics heuristics and biases human important indicating individual differences intelligence involves Journal judgment Kahneman knowledge learning less literature Major mean measures memory mental mindware normative operations outcome override paradigms participants performance person positive predict preference present probability problem Program psychology rational thinking rational thought reasoning reflective mind represent representations response result rule simulation situations skills social Source Stanovich & West strategy structure studies subjects sustained Table tasks tests theory thinking dispositions tion Tversky Type 2 processing understanding University Press