A Treatise of Human Nature |
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actions advantage agreeable allow'd appear argument arises beauty belief betwixt body causation cause and effect cerning cism colour common concerning conclusion connexion consequently consider consider'd constant conjunction contiguity continu'd existence contrary cou'd degree deriv'd distinct emotion encrease entirely equal establish'd esteem esteem'd experience explain'd fancy farther feel force and vivacity human nature identity imagination immediately impressions and ideas inference infinite divisibility influence injustice instances interest judgment justice kind love and hatred manner matter mind moral motion never nexion obligation observ'd observe operation opinion original ourselves pain particular perceive perceptions person phænomenon philosophy plac'd pleasure possession present pride and humility principles probability proceed produc'd produce propensity qualities reason reflection regard relation of ideas resemblance sceptical SECT sensation senses sensible sentiments shew shou'd society species suppos'd suppose sympathy thing thought tion tis evident tis impossible transition twill uneasiness vice virtue wou'd
Popular passages
Page 251 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.
Page 250 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.
Page xxi - tis evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. \$Ve must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures.
Page 467 - So that •when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.
Page 170 - A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
Page 467 - In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a god, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is...
Page 181 - I should reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person, was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity, has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel...
Page 8 - This uniting principle among ideas is not to be considered as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination: nor yet are we to conclude that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails...
Page 155 - I believe the most general and most popular explication of this matter is to say * that, finding from experience that there are several new productions in matter, such as the motions and variations of body, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power and efficacy. But...
Page 267 - Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.